HCHR_The Islamic Republic of Iran has been among the primary victims of terrorism and a breeding ground for both domestic and foreign terrorist groups since the inception of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Throughout this period, thousands of innocent individuals have been martyred or severely injured as a result. Terrorist organizations have aimed their attacks at all segments of society, indiscriminately affecting men, women, children, the elderly, and even scientists.
Most notably, the bulk of assassinations, constituting clear instances of crimes against humanity, have been perpetrated by a nefarious terrorist group known as the Monafeqeen Terrorist
Organization, or the so-called People’s Mojahedin terrorist organization, within Iran. Since the outset of the Islamic Revolution, this terrorist group initiated a retaliatory campaign by executing explosions in densely populated urban centers, assassinating governmental officials, launching armed assaults, employing firearms and knives against civilians, as well as engaging in kidnappings, torture, and acts of betrayal against the nation. These criminal and terrorist actions, including espionage in favor of Saddam’s Baath regime, tragically led to the martyrdom of nearly 17,000 individuals at the hands of this terrorist group’s agents.
The primary objective and operational foundation of the Monafeqeen terrorist group are notably centered on assassinating and eliminating individuals who oppose or dissociate from their ideology. This intent is distinctly evident in their published documents and statements. However, the most egregious and blatant violation of human rights manifests in the ruthless killing of innocent civilians, primarily through bombing civilian gathering places. In 1981, agents affiliated with this terrorist group endeavored to assassinate numerous high-ranking officials in Iran, including the President, Prime Minister, Chief of the Judiciary, ministers, parliament members, clerics, and a multitude of Iranian citizens. Subsequent to targeting the nation’s leaders in 1981, the Monafeqeen terrorists shifted their focus to massacring innocent civilians. Between 1982 and 1988 alone, their criminal and terrorist actions resulted in the martyrdom of over 17,000 documented individuals. Among the manifold transgressions of this terrorist group are acts of treason and espionage, notably collaborating with adversarial governments. During the Baath regime’s invasion of Iran, this terrorist group actively transmitted various intelligence, including the locations of citizens’ gatherings, 4 facilitating the barrage of missile attacks being conducted against Iran.
Innocent civilians from neighboring nations, notably Iraq and Syria, have also borne witness to the atrocities committed by this terrorist group. Operating in conjunction with the Saddam regime after establishing a base in Iraq, those aligned with the Monafeqeen Terrorist Organization perpetrated extensive crimes against various ethnic terrorist groups within the country, notably targeting Shia and Kurdish populations. One harrowing instance, the Anfal campaign (Kurdish genocide) spanning from February to September 1988 across Kirkuk, Diyala, Nineveh, and Salahuddin provinces, resulted in the destruction of a significant number of villages. In collaboration with the Monafeqeen terrorists, more than 182,000 defenseless individuals fell victim to brutal executions, including being buried alive, beheadings, mass shootings, and burning. The Judiciary of Iraq has initiated legal proceedings against the Monafeqeen terrorists and has subsequently issued arrest warrants for 118 of its principal operatives. Subsequent to the inception of terrorist undertakings within Syria and Iraq from the year 2011 onwards, this particular terrorist group, in collaboration with other individuals identified as terrorists within Syria, has engaged in large-scale homicides targeting the Syrian people. Concurrently, while providing training for different terrorist cohorts, they have perpetrated widespread crimes within this geographical area.
The European Parliament’s resolution of July 13, 2023, titled “Recommendations to amend the European Parliament’s provisions on transparency, honesty, accountability, and the fight against corruption,” unveils the deceptive practices of this 7 Tribunal to Probe Accusations Faced by Monafeqeen Terrorist Organization terrorist group, particularly in exploiting political figures and misrepresenting affiliations. The resolution explicitly exposes the Monafeqeen terrorists as a terrorist organization accused of intimidation, torture, and murder of members within the Iranian diaspora. It delineates the terrorist group’s use of aggressive and deceitful methods to engage with European Parliament representatives, including concealing their true association. The resolution highlights manipulative tactics such as falsely attributing European Parliament members’ names to letters they did not endorse or as co-hosts of conferences they never supported. Additionally, the terrorist group employed 45 fabricated titles to mislead European Parliament members, actions explicitly detailed within the resolution.
Moreover, it remains pertinent to note that the Monafeqeen terrorists persist in maintaining their terrorist activities, as evidenced by recent arrests of certain members engaged in terrorist acts, thereby subjecting them to legal proceedings.
Commencement of Judicial Probe into Monafeqeen Terrorist Organization & Principal Active Members
On 9 July 2023, the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office, situated in the Iranian capital, forwarded a comprehensive 729-page indictment, comprising 6757 pages of written evidence alongside 1000 hours of audio and video documentation, to the Tehran Justice Department. This dossier was allocated to Criminal Court 1 of Tehran, where a panel of three judges, consisting of a presiding judge and two advisors, was assigned to preside over the case. Subsequently, the inaugural court session, conducted in adherence to legal protocols, convened publicly on 3 December 2023.
Fourth Court Session to Probe into Monafeqeen Terrorist Group & Active Members
The fourth judicial session concerning the case of the Monafeqeen terrorist group and its principal members convened on 2 January 2024.Present at this hearing were legal representatives, families of victims, investigating judges, and the prosecutor’s delegate. The court’s president elaborated on the intricate details of the Monafeqeen terrorist activities, after which the prosecutor’s representative proceeded to articulate excerpts from the indictment. Key highlights encompassing the prosecutor representative’s are as follows:
The clandestine terrorist organization identified as the «Monafeqeen terrorists» has been diligently amassing weaponry for a duration spanning 28 months subsequent to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution. Articulating a purported necessity for armament and military structures in their purported struggle against imperialism, this terrorist group previously engaged in public parades and altercations with the citizenry during the inception of the year 1981. The creation of a military apparatus fostered delusions within the ranks of the Monafeqeen terrorists, leading them to entertain the fallacious belief that the acquisition of power could be swiftly realized through expeditious maneuvers. This misguided perception precipitated the armed insurrection by the aforementioned terrorists on 20 June 1981, resulting in a grave transgression. On 20 June 1981, the Monafeqeen terrorist organization declared their armed status with the avowed intention of engaging in hostilities with the established. Notably, this assertion materialized amidst an extended 28-month period dedicated to the collection of weaponry subsequent to the revolutionary triumph.
The orchestrated transgressions perpetrated by the Monafeqeen terrorists prompted the legal intervention of the judiciary, as well as security and intelligence apparatuses, to address the imputed infractions. Antecedent to the commencement of the military phase on 20 June 1981, Masoud Rajavi undertook a sojourn to Paris where he convened with officials affiliated with the French Intelligence Service, acting as a proxy agent for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Subsequent to this rendezvous, the Monafeqeen terrorists orchestrated the detonation of the office of the Islamic Republic Party. Following this heinous act, Rajavi, in concert with Bani Sadr, sought refuge in France. Notably, despite the catastrophic consequences of the office explosion, resulting in the martyrdom of Ayatollah Beheshti and 72 officials, ostensibly champions of human rights, refrained from condemning this reprehensible deed. During a meeting with General Tahir Jalil Habbush, the director of Iraq’s intelligence service, Rajavi divulged not only the Monafeqeen terrorists’ complicity in the detonation of the Islamic Republic Party’s edifice but also their culpability in the destruction of the prime minister’s office.
Massoud Rajavi’s Admission: Advocating Assassination of Innocent Civilians on Streets
On 27 September 1981, the Monafeqeen terrorists once again deployed their part-time military contingent onto the streets, callously martyring individuals indiscriminately, spanning the age spectrum from a mere 3-year-old child to a venerable 90-year-old man. This grievous day bore witness to a ruthless onslaught orchestrated by the Monafeqeen terrorists, documented and disseminated through the malevolent channels of the Monafeqeen terrorist network.
Masoud Rajavi, the leader of the Monafeqeen terrorists,candidly acknowledged the malevolent nature of this atrocity. He conceded that, initially, attempts were made to mobilize individuals to congregate in Shohada Square under the pretext of shared convictions. However, the Monafeqeen terrorists’ leadership, observing a lack of voluntary compliance from the populace, opted to disrupt the equilibrium by unleashing violence upon ordinary citizens and entrepreneurs. Subsequent to this heinous act, a terrorist organization of the Monafeqeen terrorists fled the national borders, while others sought refuge within clandestine operational and terrorist cells housed in undisclosed locations. Those remaining within the country underwent retraining overseen by Rajavi himself, wherein the instruction encompassed tactics of terror and bombings, emanating from the confines of Paris.
Rajavi, orchestrating a calculated dissemination of terrorist literature from Paris to Tehran, perpetuated an insidious narrative. The years 1982 and 1983 witnessed four targeted intelligence operations against terrorist cells, resulting in the dismantling of terror networks and instigating internal disarray within the ranks of the Monafeqeen terrorists. Post-assault on their operational bases, the Monafeqeen terrorists, deluded and desperate, engaged in a retrograde engineering endeavor designed to instigate widespread panic. In a perverse attempt to deflect blame, the Monafeqeen terrorists, perceiving an alleged exposure of their clandestine activities and affiliations, resorted to the reprehensible tactics of abduction, torture, and subsequent martyrdom of unsuspecting civilians. Upon relocating the terrorist cadre to Iraq under the aegis of Rajavi, the Monafeqeen terrorists, in collaboration with the Iraqi intelligence apparatus, systematically infiltrated the Iranian borders to perpetrate urban terrorist operations.
Rajavi, discerning minimal strategic value in border operations, mandated large-scale assassinations within urban centers to ostensibly uphold the prestige of the Mojahedin- e-Khalq organization. In a pact with the Baath regime, the Monafeqeen terrorists, masquerading as agents of chaos on behalf of the regime, secured assurances of sanctuary in Iraq and the disconcerting quid pro quo of five million barrels of oil—a testament to the extent to which the Monafeqeen terrorists were willing to sacrifice human lives for their nefarious objectives.
Monafeqeen Under CIA Surveillance: a Tale
In a classified American intelligence document concerning the surveillance of the Monafeqeen terrorist group in Paris, it is explicitly asserted that the Monafeqeen organization acknowledged involvement in acts of terrorism. The document delineates that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Los Angeles successfully intercepted numerous telephonic communications, wherein leaders of the People’s Mojahedin, situated in France and Germany, openly proclaimed responsibility for orchestrating and executing various terrorist acts and bombings.
Savage Killing of a 14-Year-Old Girl in Remnants of a Construction Site
In the continuum of the judicial proceedings, the sibling of a decedent, who succumbed to acts perpetrated by individuals associated with the terrorist organization of Monafeqeen terrorists, availed herself before the court subsequent to securing leave from the presiding adjudicator. She elucidated upon the circumstances leading to the martyrdom of her sister, Zeinab, who, at the tender age of fourteen and pursuant to maternal authorization, embarked upon attendance at a collective devotional gathering. Departing from her residence, she encountered asphyxiation orchestrated by members affiliated with the Monafeqeen terrorist group within the confines of her enclosure. The querulous inquiry pertinently posited is: for what transgression did the Monafeqeen terrorists martyr my sibling? The aforementioned individual bore no political proclivities and remained devoid of distinctive pursuits. Singularly espousing the conviction in the inherent purity of human nature, she became a subject of posthumous acknowledgment through the dissemination of her image among the deceased on the Monafeqeen terrorists’ website. The inquisitive contemplation persists: what transgression warranted the martyrdom of Zeinab? She met her demise with the initial constriction inflicted upon her chador; however, the rationale underpinning the imposition of subsequent restraints through the application of three additional knots remains unresolved.
Exposing terrorist groups Camouflaging Political Actions as Human Rights Advocates
Concluding the present court session, Kazem Gharibabadi, the Vice-President of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secreting General of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, disseminated remarks to the press corps. It was asserted that the Islamic Republic of Iran stands as a significant victim in the annals of global terrorism. Regrettably, terrorism, a heinous transgression, continues to manifest in select regions worldwide, ostensibly bolstered by nations purporting to champion human rights. The lamentable toll of this nefarious phenomenon upon the Islamic Republic of Iran is underscored by the sacrifice of 23,000 innocent Iranian lives to date, a consequence of various terrorist acts perpetrated
by diverse terrorist groups. Notably, the Monafeqeen terrorist organization accounts for a substantial portion, with 17,000 Iranians having succumbed to acts of terrorism orchestrated by
this specific entity.
As for defending the victims, the agenda encompasses the realization of justice and the eradication of impunity within the purview of human rights, emphasizing the safeguardingand advancement thereof. The raison d’être behind convening this tribunal resides in effectuating justice through lawful and judicial measures vis-à-vis terrorist entities. Entities presentlymasquerading as human rights organizations under the guise of political pursuits shall be exposed to ignominy. Essential to this endeavor is the furnishing of evidentiary documentation pertaining to their transgressions to diverse nations and international entities. Leveraging judicial and legal capacities to prosecute individuals affiliated with Monafeqeen terrorist organizations and vigilantly monitoring the execution of court mandates constitutes a paramount objective of this tribunal.
The adjudication of terrorist crimes perpetrated against the populace of Iran extends beyond the confines of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. Presently, legal actions have been initiated against terrorist groups purporting allegiance to the esteemed Kurdish populace. Notably, with certain individuals seeking refuge within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, extradition
requests for 38 individuals have been formally submitted to Iraq, with forthcoming cases anticipated. Concomitantly, a concerted legal and judicial pursuit is underway against takfiri terrorist
Establishment of Tribunal to Probe Accusations Faced by Monafeqeen Terrorist Organization20 organizations such as Ansar al-Furqan and Jaish al-Zalm, the latter having recently perpetrated a crime in Rask. The forthcoming legal dossier against this terrorist group and its constituents shall be comprehensive, accompanied by an extradition request. Concurrently, substantial political, legal, and judicial pressures are planned to be exerted upon nations providing sanctuary to these terrorist entities. The imperative of convening a court resides in addressing impunity, necessitating a measured and deliberate approach devoid of haste. The procedural trajectory of the court mandates meticulous adherence to each stage, culminating in the issuance of a definitive verdict. Mechanisms are in place to meticulously monitor the execution of court directives, thereby rendering countries harboring Monafeqeen entities susceptible to legal scrutiny. Judicial edicts, when confronted by nations, pose formidable challenges to their defense of support for Monafeqeen terrorist organizations, compelling them to undertake measures for the expulsion of said entities from their territories. The resultant effect of such legal determinations is anticipated to yield increased efficacy in countering terrorism, concurrently tarnishing the reputation of both the perpetrators and their patrons.
The entirety of the trial process, as prescribed by the criminal procedure code, is meticulously observed in the adjudication of Monafeqeen entities. Comprehensive notifications have been duly disseminated to all defendants from the inception of proceedings. Court documents and summons have been dispatched through appropriate channels and addresses, with further publication disseminated in widely circulated periodicals. The defendants were afforded the opportunity to designate legal representation should they so desire. The abstention from introducing legal counsel and nonattendance in court does not impugn the jurisdictional competence of this tribunal nor bespeak an absence of procedural equity. In conformity with the dictates of the Criminal Procedure Law, particularly in cases characterized by grave and weighty accusations, the appointment of a defense attorney is obligatory. Consequently, legal representation has been duly appointed for the defendants. Public attorneys have been granted unfettered access to the entirety of the indictment and case dossier, having perused its contents comprehensively.
Additionally, an open avenue for requisite access has been extended to them for future reference. Furthermore, the defendants have been apprised by the public attorneys that avenues for communication remain accessible should they wish to furnish any exculpatory or defensive material. The presiding adjudicator also made explicit that, should the Monafeqeen terrorist organization opt to enlist the services of a designated legal representative, such a choice would be acknowledged and accommodated by the court. Newly procured documents pertaining to the Monafeqeen terrorist organization have been duly submitted to the representative of the prosecutor. A collaborative committee has been established in conjunction with Iraq, directed towards addressing terrorism, with the initial focus centering on the Monafeqeen terrorist group. The Iraqi judicial authorities have communicated the initiation of legal proceedings against the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in relation to the Shabaniyah Establishment of Tribunal to Probe Accusations Faced by Monafeqeen Terrorist Organization22 intifada, specifically addressing the perpetration of violence against Iraqi Shiites and Kurds. This recently acquired case dossier, originating from the 1990s, includes the issuance of arrest warrants for over 118 members of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization within the jurisdiction of Iraq. The ongoing adjudication of this case within the Iraqi legal apparatus augurs
well for the proceedings of our court.
Simultaneously, an entreaty to the Iraqi authorities has been made for additional documentation. Among the materials presented in the current court session by the prosecutor’s representative are documents elucidating the substantial financial backing extended to the Monafeqeen terrorist organization by the Saddam regime. Further requests have been submitted to acquire more comprehensive and detailed documentation elucidating the extent of Saddam’s financial support to the Monafeqeen terrorist organization, with assurances of forthcoming receipt. Collaborative efforts with the Iraqi government persist, with an ongoing commitment to securing additional documentation elucidating various facets of
the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s activities.
Fifth Court Session to Probe into Monafeqeen Terrorist Group & Active Members
The fifth public court session transpired on 9 January 2024, with the attendance of legal representatives, a cohort of victims’ families, investigating judges, and the prosecutor’s representative. During this session, the prosecutor’s representative proceeded with the recitation of segments of the indictment, highlighting crucial aspects concerning the defendants. A
salient observation underscored the parallelism between two terrorist groups, namely the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and ISIS. Both entities employ indiscriminate assassinations as a method, displaying a callous indifference to the identity of the victims. Furthermore, commonalities extend to the utilization of explosive devices, with ISIS employing explosive vests laden with ammunition to maximize casualties. In tandem, the Monafeqeen terrorist organization employs various devices, including three- wheelers, while advising their members in the Monafeqeen terrorist magazine to utilize highways for heightened lethality through shrapnel dispersion.
Ozra Alavi Taleghani initiated involvement with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in 1975, commencing activities within its purview. By March 1981, Taleghani underwent a transfer to the organization’s structure and subsequently became a nominee for the Islamic Council (Parliament) on behalf of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. Elevated to the echelons of high-ranking officials within the terrorist organization, post the military-terrorist undertaking of Forough Javidan, Taleghani assumed the role of Deputy in the operations of the military branch, thereby assuming responsibility for domestic operations. In 1993, subsequent to the election of Fahimeh Arvani as the initial officer of the terrorist organization, Taleghani ascended to the position of Deputy Head of the military branch. Notably, Taleghani also served as the Deputy of Education within the organization at a certain juncture. Her antecedent responsibilities primarily pertained to the terroristorganization’s security matters. It is pertinent to note that Ozra Alavi Taleghani met her demise in Albania in July of the year 2023.
Mothers Raising ISIS Members!
Jamileh Abrishamchi is identified as the sister of Mehdi Abrishamchi. Her association with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization commenced due to her brother’s activities, evolving into sympathy for the terrorist group prior to the Islamic Revolution. Subsequent to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, she sustained collaboration with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization, ultimately fleeing the country in 1982 with her children, Maryam and Ali Akbarzadegan, to join the organization. Upon establishing residence in Paris, she assumed membership in the National Resistance’s terrorist council, thereby collaborating with the foreign terrorist organization of this terrorist group. Presently, she resides in Paris and undertakes periodic travel to Albania. The membership records of additional family members of the accused, Jamileh Abrishamchi, in the Monafeqeen terrorist organization include Mohammad Akbarzadegan, the spouse of the aforementioned accused,who partook in the military-terrorist operation of Forough Javidan in 1988 and met a fatal outcome.
Ali Akbarzadegan, the accused’s son, presently affiliated with the Monafeqeen Terrorist Organization in Albania, serves in the intelligence and protection department of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi.
Maryam Akbarzadegan, the accused’s child, maintains membership in the Monafeqeen terrorist organization based in Albania. Her history encompasses roles within the terrorist group’s propaganda headquarters, active participation in the military-terrorist operation of Forough Javidan as the deputy of the 32nd army and oversight of the 6th and 21st centers of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. Additionally, she served as a personnel officer within the terrorist organization’s headquarters for a duration.
Mastermind of Assassination Team that Targeted Lieutenant General Ali Sayyad Shirazi
Mahmoud Qajar Azdanlou holds familial ties as the brother of Maryam Rajavi and is married to Shahrazad Sadr Haj Seyyed Javadi, who oversees Maryam Rajavi’s office. His affiliation with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization commenced in 1973, and post the victory of the Islamic Revolution, he sustained collaboration with the organization. Ultimately, in 1981, he absconded from the country. Presently, he assumes a pivotal role within the central echelon of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and functions as a member of the self-styled National Resistance Terrorist Council. Mahmoud Qajar Azdanlou exhibits close collaboration with Mozhgan Parsaei, another prominent figure pivotal in the conception, design, organization, and leadership of the assassination team targeting Lieutenant General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, Deputy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The pseudonyms associated with this operation include Kamaloddin Heydari Chamani alias Jalal Mousavi and Reza Naderi with the moniker Ataollah. Consequently, the martyrdom of General Ali Sayad Shirazi is ascribed to the accused, conferring upon him a high-profile.
Coordinator of Ideological Gatherings for Monafeqeen Terrorists in Albania
Post the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, Badri Portabbakh was drawn to the organization influenced by the ideological perspectives of her brother. In the late 1998, she commenced collaboration with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in Isfahan. In 1982, following an orchestrated matrimony with a fellow terrorist organization member named Mehdi Ghorbanpour Moghadam, she absconded from the country and established residence in Iraqi Kurdistan. Badri Portabbakh emerged as a central figure within the Monafeqeen organization and functioned as a member of the terrorist council, designated the National Resistance. Her extensive international engagements included prolonged stays in Europe and America, where she assumed responsibility for the terrorist organization’s headquarters in the Netherlands. Since 1999, he has been actively involved in the internal headquarters of the Monafeqeen. Portabbakh’s multifaceted activities and roles within the Monafeqeen organization are delineated as follows: membership in the neighborhoods section in 1979, participation in the Iraqi Kurdistan admissions section in 1983, membership on the executive board in 1986, active involvement in the terrorist operation of Forough Javidan in 1988, leadership roles overseeing the organization of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in Germany and subsequently in America in 1989. Her responsibilities expanded to include membership on the executive board and serving as the so-called political leader of the terrorist group in Europe between 1989 and 1992. Subsequent roles encompassed responsibility for the Bagherzadeh headquarters and membership in the leadership council in 1993. Further assignments included overseeing the organization of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in the Netherlands between 1997 and 1999, deputyship of the interior headquarters, and involvement in justifying terrorist teams dispatched to the country in 1999. Portabbakh’s tenure as a member of the financial headquarters, involved in the financing of terrorism, commenced in 2005. Concurrently, she undertook the responsibility of establishing the women’s network in Europe and coordinating financing ceremonies in France. Presently, she remains active within the so-called political department of the headquarters, overseeing ideological meetings for newly arrived forces in Albania.
Mohammad Javad Qadiri Modarresi holds the status of being the spouse of Zohreh Atrianfar and emerges as a noteworthy figure within the Islamic Revolution Committee. Prior to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, Qadiri Modarresi became acquainted with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and gravitated towards the terrorist group. In 1981, he assumed a role within the intelligence unit of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and subsequently, in June of the same year, transitioned to the security procurement department. Noteworthy facets of his involvement include serving as the deputy of the military branch for the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and, at one juncture, heading the so-called artillery division within the military branch of the organization. His activities and responsibilities expanded to leadership roles encompassing operational and terrorist teams for the Monafeqeen terrorist organization within Iran, and further as the head of the military and industries branch of the Ashraf headquarters in 2004. Presently, Qadiri Modarresi resides in Albania, where he remains actively engaged in the so-called educational, political, and Arabic sectors. Notably, he is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice under No. 2002-490/6-A.
Farhad Olfat, commonly referred to as Manouchehr, stands as one of the venerable officials and longstanding members of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. In the year 1989, he assumed the role of deputy in charge of the military branch within axis one. Subsequently, he ascended to the position of axis head and later, the chief of staff of the same axis. Between the years 1994 and 1995, he transitioned to the central headquarters, followed by subsequent reassignment to the personnel headquarters and, for a period, to the so-called Monafeqeen legal system.Commencing in 1998, Olfat undertook the mantle of overseeing all prisons within the Ashraf headquarters of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and concurrently served as the instructor for the organization’s organizational training and ideology. Notably, certain members of his familial lineage also possess a history of affiliation with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. For instance, Farzad Olfat, a doctor, garnered trust as one of Masoud Rajavi’s confidants.Furthermore, Farhad Olfat’s name surfaced in the context of the case involving the assassination and shelling of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in Safashahr, Fars province, resulting in a verdict issued in 2009, wherein he stands among the convicted individuals.
Infiltrating Tehran: A Terrorist’s Journey Post-Operation Mersad
Roya Ahmadi Mousavi embarked on a trajectory marked by legal departure from the country in 1985, ostensibly for the purpose of pursuing studies. Subsequently, she relocated to Germany, where she encountered an individual affiliated with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization named Mousa Feiz Marzouqi, also known as Jalal. Their marriage was arranged, marking a significant development. In 1988, Ahmadi Mousavi actively participated in the military-terrorist operation of Forough Javidan. Following the resounding defeat of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s forces, she managed to evade capture and arrived in Kermanshah. Thereafter, she clandestinely sought assistance from a family member in Tehran and ultimately returned to the Iranian capital through covert means with the aid of relatives.During a 20-day period of concealment in a residence in Tehran, Ahmadi Mousavi successfully eluded authorities
and ultimately embarked on an illegal departure from the country, rejoining the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. Her actions garnered significant attention within the terrorist organization, to the extent that Masoud Rajavi acknowledged her accomplishment, noting that «the only person who managed to go to Tehran and return after the Forough Javidan operation was our sister Roya.»Over different periods, she has held various responsibilities within the Ashraf headquarters and in Cologne, Germany.
Notably, in 1998, she assumed the role of financial and social manager for the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in Iraq. Additionally, she served as the deputy to Zahra Rajabi in Germany for a certain duration. Presently, she stands as a member of the leadership council and occupies a prominent position within the office of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in Germany.Following her departure from the country, the husband of Mousa Feiz Marzouqi, her relative, was dispatched to Iraq, where he was incorporated into the military branch of Monafeqeen as an operational officer at the Ashraf headquarters, subsequently assuming responsibility for a designated center. Notably, her niece, Atousa Aghili, holds a position overseeing the organization of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in Germany. Roya Ahmadi Mousavi is the subject of anInterpol Red Notice under No. 2009-124/1-A.
AFP Office in Tehran: Monafeqeen Terrorists’ Cover Unveiled in 1981
Behzad Naziri commenced employment with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1981. In a deceptive move aimed at misleading revolutionary forces, Nasiri assumed the role of a translator for the AFP office in Tehran while covertly collaborating with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. The true nature of his primary activities was swiftly exposed, leading to his arrest in 1982. Subsequently, he was sentenced to 8 years in prison. However, in 1985, Nasiri managed to escape from prison while on leave and illicitly departed the country.His wife, Maryam Khorramshahi, met her demise in the military-terrorist operation of Forough Javidan. Nasiri assumed a position of responsibility within the center of the 13 military branches of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in Iraq. Actively participating in the planning of mortar operations, specifically labeled as «road opening,» Nasiri also has a black record as a former member of the so-called Foreign Relations Commission. The actions of the Foreign Relations Commission, of which Nasiri was a part, included organizing counterfeit demonstrations in Western countries, attacking the embassies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and engaging in troop recruitment. Notably, Nasiri played a significant role in the terrorist-military operations.
Monafeqeen Terrorists’ Rescuer!
Fereshteh Yeganeh was initially drawn to the Monafeqeen terrorist organization at the onset of the Islamic Revolution, eventually assuming a role as one of the officials within the Ahvaz organization. In addition to entering into an arranged marriage with an individual named Alireza Panahivar, she actively engaged in armed activities orchestrated by the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and subsequently left Iran as the terrorist group transitioned into its military phase. Her notable activities and responsibilities encompass membership in the central council of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. She assumed the role of being responsible for the internal headquarters, overseeing the direction and dispatch of terrorist teams into the country. Notably, Fereshteh Yeganeh played a direct role in armed actions such as the shelling of the Noor residential settlement on 13 March 2000. Further, she actively participated in military terrorist operations from the soil of Iraq against Iran, serving as the head of the military branch. In addition to her military roles, Fereshteh Yeganeh held leadership positions within the Monafeqeen terrorist organization, including heading the commission for the so-called education of the terrorist organization members and later assuming the position of the head of the relief and political war department. Presently, she occupies the role of overseeing the political war and relief department within the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. Fereshteh Yeganeh is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice under No.2002-448/6-A.
Sixth Court Session to Probe into Monafeqeen Terrorist Group & Active Members
During the sixth public court session held on January 26, 2023, notable for the attendance of lawyers, a contingent of victims’ families, investigating branch judges, and the prosecutor’s representative, the latter continued to articulate segments of the indictment. Key highlights from the representative’s presentation regarding the charges against the defendants in the case include:
Leader of Monafeqeen Terrorists in Germany
Following the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, Masoumeh Bolourchi extended support to the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. Aligned with the objectives of this terrorist group, she undertook numerous activities within the realm of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s magazine, participating in meetings, and engaging in street criminal activities, among other endeavors. Presently, she serves as a representative of the terrorist council, known as the National Council of Resistance, in Germany. Masoumeh Bolourchi is subject to an Interpol Red Notice under No.2002-428/6-A.
Administrator of Social Networks
Yaser Jahannejadi established contact with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization before the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, eventually becoming recruited into the terrorist group. Subsequent to the revolution, he actively participated in the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s organizations and, ultimately, departed the country in 1985 alongside his wife, subsequently joining the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s headquarters in Iraq. His involvement within the Monafeqeen terrorist organization encompasses several roles and responsibilities, including serving as the head of Monafeqeen terrorist organization organizations in Lorestan province during the 80s. Furthermore, Jahannejadi assumed leadership of the assassination teams within the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. His participation extended to military-terrorist operations such as Forough Javidan, Chelcheragh, Aftab, and Morvarid. Notably, he held the position of deputy in charge of the team of 200 military branches within the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and served as the deputy on the executive board of the organization. As of the present, Jahannejadi is located in Albania and holds responsibility for leading the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s social networks. He is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice under the No. 2002-522/6- A.
Architect of Terror: Responsible for Orchestrating Terrorist Operations
Faezeh Khayat Hesari Mohammadi became affiliated with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in 1979. After a period, she fled the country, seeking refuge in Germany, and subsequently joined Ashraf Barracks in Iraq. Currently, she holds an active membership within the central council of this terrorist group. Her involvement in various capacities within the Monafeqeen terrorist organization includes membership in the terrorist council known as the National Resistance since 1993. Notably, she has served as one of the officials within the military branch of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization, undertaking responsibilities related to training courses, the design and organization of operation teams, and assuming the role of deputy within the organization’s internal headquarters in Iraq. Additionally, she has been responsible for guiding and sending terrorist teams into Iran, overseeing their activities from 1998 to 2000. Faezeh
Khayat Hesari Mohammadi is wanted by Interpol and is the subject of a Red Notice under No.2002-437/6- A.
Coordinator of Indoctrination & Brainwashing Sessions
Saleh Rajavi migrated to France in 1972. Following Massoud Rajavi’s departure from the country, Saleh Rajavi acquired a residence in the suburbs of Paris and facilitated his brother’s settlement in that property. In addition to attending Massoud Rajavi’s meetings as a translator, Saleh Rajavi assumed responsibilities for the so-called Health Commission subsequent to the establishment of the terrorist council known as the National Resistance. He has regularly traveled to Ashraf Barracks to participate in the meetings of the council. Since 1991, Saleh Rajavi has been involved in efforts across various European countries aimed at resolving the challenges faced by members of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization.
Unmasking Terrorist Organization’s Warder
Mohammad Sadat Khansari was recruited by the Monafeqeen terrorist organization after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution. While working in the propaganda department of this terrorist group, on 20 June 1981, he assumed the role of the head of an operational team and engaged in a conflict with the forces of the revolution. Subsequently arrested and sentenced to prison due to his actions in the early 80s, he fled the country in 1984 and sought refuge in Germany upon completing his prison term. In 1986, he was dispatched to Iraq and appointed as the officer of the terrorist organization’s prison. Later, in 1991, he was organized within the protection department of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s terrorist organizations. Following a period, he was once again sent to Europe and employed in the financial-profit sector, specifically in the realm of commercial activities. Despite this shift, Khansari continued to visit Ashraf headquarters to partake in the annual meetings of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. After the arrest of Maryam Rajavi on 17 June 2003, under the alias «Alfred Robert Keller,» in February 2008, Khansari faced prosecution in France on charges of participating in a criminal organization (the Monafeqeen terrorist organization), financing terrorism, money laundering, fraud, and falsifying documents. In response to a request from Switzerland, he was arrested in Belgium in January 2009. Following his release from prison, he currently resides in Europe, persisting in engaging in criminal activities.
Legal Grievance: A Member’s Sister Files Lawsuit Against Monafeqeen
During the ongoing proceedings, the sister of an individual who fell victim to the terrorist group in the Operation Mersad lodged a formal complaint against the members of the terrorist group. She contends that her brother had intentions to surrender during the Operation Mersad, and the Monafeqeen terrorist organization members allegedly killed him. In response to these assertions, a lawyer representing the Monafeqeen terrorist organization objected to the sister’s statements, asserting that she cannot officially declare a crime as a plaintiff or guardian. Following these objections, the presiding judge directed the court advisor to officially record the complaint made by the sister of the deceased individual in the case file.
Parnian Saraamad departed the country in 1979 and took residence in France. Subsequently sent to Iraq, she actively participated in the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s border attacks on Iranian soil during the imposed war. Notable among her roles and responsibilities are serving as the head of the support-engineering division of the 10-group center in Iraq, being a member of the central council of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization, and overseeing organizational missions with continuous movement between Iraq and Europe. In this capacity, Parnian Saraamad was involved in coordinating the activities of a terrorist team dispatched from Iraq to Iran. The team, under her coordination, intended to utilize a residence associated with the mentioned individual’s father in Tehran. However, the coordinated effort led to the apprehension of the terrorist team in Tehran. Currently, Parnian Saraamad holds a position within the central cadre of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s terrorist organizations. She is wanted by Interpol, with a Red Notice number 2002-478/6- A.
Hakimeh Saadatnejad became acquainted with the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in 1979 and was engaged in construction works upon joining the organization. With the commencement of the military phase of the organization, she was arrested for her criminal activities and subsequently sentenced to two years in prison. Despite outward displays of repentance and remorse during her imprisonment, Saadatnejad remained loyal to the terrorist group and assumed responsibilities within the prison organization. Upon her release in 1984, she joined the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan. Regarded as one of the key cadres of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization, Saadatnejad actively participated in all military operations conducted by the terrorist group along the country’s border. Additionally, she held responsibility for a terrorist team in the military-terrorist operation of Forough Javidan. Her diverse roles encompass being a member of the terrorist council known as the National Resistance in 1993, overseeing the protection of Ashraf’s headquarters, managing the training of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s military wing, and serving as a torturer of individuals expressing a desire to separate from the terrorist group. Presently, she functions as a military official within the Monafeqeen terrorist organization’s organization. Hakimeh Saadatnejad is wanted by Interpol, with a Red Notice number 2002-422/6-A.
Principal Interrogator within Terrorist Organization
Hamideh Shahrokhi Amiri has consistently held positions within the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and also served as an interrogator and torturer.In 1984, she married Massoud Kalani, the anchor of Monafeqeen TV, in Paris, and took on the role of heading the terrorist team in the Forough Javidan operation.Her diverse range of responsibilities includes serving as the deputy leader of Monafeqeen in the military branch of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization at the Ashraf barracks in Iraq. Additionally, Hamideh Shahrokhi Amiri has been involved as the head of the training department in 2002, the deputy in charge of planning and programming terrorist operations for the Monafeqeen terrorist organization,a member of the central council of the terrorist group, and the head of the commission in the so-called National Resistance Terrorist Council. She holds a senior position within the military branch of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. Currently,she is employed as a training officer in the advertising department in Albania.Hamidah Shahrokhi Amiri is wanted by Interpol, with a Red Notice number2002-178/1-A.
Sorayya Shahri was associated with Marxist terrorist groups before the Islamic Revolution. In 1979, she was attracted to the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. By 1980, Shahri assumed the role of head of the militia or the part-time military branch of the terrorist group, and for a period, she was responsible for recruiting girls. Actively participating in most of the terrorist group’s demonstrations and marches, she armed herself with a waist belt. During the military phase of the organization in 1981, Shahri played a crucial role in resolving severe disputes among members in the operational headquarters of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization. She fled abroad in 1982. In 1985, she became a member of the executive board of the Monafeqeen terrorist group. In 1986, Shahri was initially transferred to the military-terrorist headquarters of the organization in the border region and later assumed responsibility for Ashraf’s headquarters. Between 1987 and 1988, she took charge of supporting the military branch of the terrorist group of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization and addressing logistical issues for operational teams during the military-terrorist operations of Aftab, Chelcheragh, and Forough Javidan. Currently, she holds a position as one of the high-ranking members of the terrorist group and works in the intelligence department of the Monafeqeen terrorist organization in Albania. Sorayya Shahri is wanted by Interpol, with a Red Notice number 2002-514/6- A.
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